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Abstract
Zero deforestation commitments (ZDCs) are voluntary initiatives where companies or countries
pledge to eliminate deforestation from their supply chains. These commitments offermuch promise
for sustainable commodity production, but are undermined by a lack of transparency about their
coverage and impacts. Here, using state-of-the-art supply chain data, we introduce an approach to
evaluate the impact of ZDCs, linking traders and internationalmarkets to commodity-associated
deforestation in the sub-national jurisdictions fromwhich they source.We focus on the Brazilian soy
sector, wherewefind that ZDC coverage is increasing, but under-represents the Cerrado biomewhere
most soy-associated deforestation currently takes place. Though soy-associated deforestation declined
in theAmazon after the introduction of the SoyMoratorium,we observe no change in the exposure of
companies or countries adopting ZDCs to soy-associated deforestation in theCerrado.We further
assess the formulation and implementation of these ZDCs and identify several systematic weaknesses
thatmust be addressed to increase the likelihood that they achievemeaningful reductions in
deforestation in future. As the 2020 deadline for several of these commitments approaches, our
approach can provide independentmonitoring of progress toward the goal of ending commodity-
associated deforestation.
Introduction
More than 150 countries and multinational companies
have made public zero deforestation commitments
(ZDCs)—commitments to eliminate deforestation
from the production of commodities (Donofrio et al
2017). These includemultilateral commitments such as
theNewYorkDeclaration onForests (NYDF), signed in
2014 by a collection of companies, NGOs, indigenous
peoples, and national and sub-national governments;
the Amsterdam declarations, signed by six European
countries in 2015 (with a seventh, Italy, joining in
2017); and a host of unilateral commitments made by
individual companies.
If successfully implemented, these commitments
offer a powerful lever for reducing deforestation and
associated biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emis-
sions. In practice, however, the potential impact of
ZDCs is undermined by weaknesses in their definition
and implementation—not least a lack of transparency
(Climate Focus 2016, Jopke and Schoneveld 2018,
Lambin et al 2018, Garrett et al 2019). Transparency is
a prerequisite for understanding the coverage and
impact of ZDCs and crucial for their accountability
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(Gardner et al 2018). Unless implementation is verifi-
able, it is not possible to determine whether ZDCs are
actually translating into on-the-ground reductions in
deforestation. Unfortunately, most ZDCs lack a clear
blueprint for their implementation, monitoring,
or progress reporting (Donofrio et al 2017,
Rogerson 2019).
This lack of transparency arises in part because of
the limited traceability in many commodity supply
chains. Deforestation-risk products such as palm oil,
beef, timber, and soy are all traded in bulk along global
supply chains with multiple intermediaries between
producers and consumers. They may be sourced via
spot markets, and processed and incorporated into
secondary products. At various stages in the supply
chain—at storage facilities, processing plants, and
maritime vessels—products frommultiple sources are
mixed and the identity of the original source lost. Even
when companies have information about the location
of production, as for some certified supply chains, they
are often reluctant to publish such high-resolution
information.
Here, we use a state-of-the-art wall-to-wall map-
ping of the Brazilian soy supply chain from the Trans-
parency for Sustainable Economies (Trase) platform
(www.trase.earth) to address this transparency gap. By
combining official per-shipment trade records with
comprehensive asset ownership registries, sanitary
inspection records, sub-national commodity produc-
tion statistics and remote sensing data on agricultural
activities and land use change, we quantify the com-
modity-associated deforestation occurring in the sub-
national jurisdictions from which different actors
sourced soy between 2006 and 2017 (Godar et al 2016).
We thereby estimate their ‘deforestation risk’—the
amount of deforestation associated with their sour-
cing, year-on-year, and how this has changed since
individual actors have made ZDCs. We demonstrate
this approach for ZDCsmade by soy traders operating
in Brazil and by countries sourcing soy fromBrazil.
Soy is a heavily-traded oilseed and a major driver
of global deforestation (Pendrill et al 2019). Soy is tra-
ded in bulk, both as a raw bean and as a processed pro-
duct—soybeanmeal, used for animal feed, and soy oil,
which is primarily used for biofuel production and
other industrial processes (Brack et al 2016). From
2000 to 2016, the international trade in soy more than
doubled (FAO 2018a), driven by growing demand for
animal products in China and other emerging econo-
mies. Already the world’s largest soy exporter, Brazil
recently also overtook the US as the world’s largest
producer (Reuters 2018). In 2017, 73% of Brazil’s soy
harvest was exported, with major markets in China
(65%of exports) and the EuropeanUnion (15%).
The boom in soy production has changed the Bra-
zilian landscape. Since 2000, the area of soy planted in
Brazil has doubled, to cover an area of 34 Mha (IBGE
2017). This expansion has been an important direct
and indirect driver of the loss of forests and other nat-
ural vegetation—with notable regional variation
(figure 1). Since a peak in the late 2000s, clearance of
native vegetation for soy has decreased in the Amazon
biome and in older soy frontiers in the Cerrado—
notably the state of Mato Grosso (figure 1). Soy, how-
ever, continues to be a major driver of habitat loss in
the Cerrado’s Matopiba region (made up of the states
ofMaranhão, Tocantins, Piauí, and Bahia), where over
the last decade 0.5–0.8 Mha of soy each year has been
planted on recently converted land (figure 1). The high
rates of conversion in the Cerrado are especially con-
cerning because it is a global biodiversity hotspot with
little legal protection. The Cerrado is a wooded savan-
nah biome, home to more than 4800 endemic plant
and vertebrate species (Strassburg et al 2017). Though
almost half of the Cerrado has already been converted
to agriculture, only 7.5% lies in protected areas, and
on private lands landowners may clear 65%–80% of
each property (Strassburg et al 2017). In contrast, half
of the Brazilian Amazon lies within protected areas
Figure 1.The area of soy planted on land deforested less than five-years previously. Source: authors’ own calculations, based on
Agrosatélite and PRODES data.
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and landowners may only clear 20% of their land
(Soares-Filho et al 2014).
Our study demonstrates how newly available sup-
ply chain data from Trase makes it possible, for the
first time, to monitor progress against ZDCs for an
entire sector, providing a quantitative and consistent
assessment of the deforestation risk of committed and
non-committed actors in the Brazilian soy supply
chain. We find that ZDC coverage is increasing, but
remains higher in the Amazon than the Cerrado,
where most soy conversion is taking place. Soy defor-
estation declined in the Amazon after the implementa-
tion of the SoyMoratorium, a commitment by traders
to avoid the purchase of soy planted on recently defor-
ested land in the Amazon.We find no reduction, how-
ever, in the soy deforestation risk of actors in the
Cerrado since any of these ZDCs were made. Recog-
nising that several of the commitments analysed in this
study are recent (post-2014), or were made after our
time-series of soy deforestation risk and trade (i.e.
post-2017), we also reviewed information on the for-
mulation and implementation of these commitments
to assess their potential effectiveness moving forward.
Current ZDCs have several systematic weaknesses that
must be addressed to deliver on the vision of defor-
estation-free commodity production.
Methods
Monitoring ZDCs at the sub-national scale requires
mapping the sourcing patterns of supply chain actors
through time, and quantifying the commodity-asso-
ciated deforestation occurring in the jurisdictions
from which they source, as well as information about
the ZDCs themselves. We focus on ZDCs by soy
traders and consumer countries. Supply chains
are often hourglass-shaped (Lyons-White and
Knight 2018), with a small number of traders acting as
intermediaries between myriad producers and con-
sumers. The ZDCs of traders, in particular, could have
a disproportionate impact in reducing the deforesta-
tion risk of both upstream farmers and downstream
consumer-facing brands.
Mapping soy supply chains
We used data from Trase to trace the origin of and
deforestation associated with Brazilian soy exports
from 2006 to 2017. Trase uses the Spatially Explicit
Information on Production to Consumption Systems
(SEI-PCS) approach to link exports of soybean pro-
ducts back to the municipality of production (Godar
et al 2016). The SEI-PCS method is summarised
below; more detail is available in the Trase manual
(Trase 2018a). All analyses are based on SEI-PCS v2.4
(Trase 2019).
SEI-PCS uses customs declarations and/or per-
shipment bills of lading to establish the dates of depar-
ture, volumes, ownership, exporting facility, port of
export, and the country of import for specific ship-
ments of soy. A logic-based decision tree is then used
to map soy export flows back to a ‘logistic hub’. Logis-
tic hubs are supply chain nodes in a specific munici-
pality where soy is produced, stored, handled, or
transformed before export. The decision tree crosses
the consolidated customs information with other
independent data sets, including on the logistics and
taxation of trading companies, as well as production
and country-specific export permissions per facility,
so that multiple lines of evidence are used to confirm a
given subnational location as the origin of production
of a given shipment. Where it is not possible to con-
fidently trace flows back to a specific logistic hub, the
origin is labelled as unknown (SI is available online at
stacks.iop.org/ERL/15/035003/mmedia).
Where the decision tree traces soy back to a storage
or processing facility but not amunicipality of soy pro-
duction, linear programming techniques are used to
allocate soy from municipalities of production to
logistic hubs. This constrained optimisation dis-
tributes available supply (total soy production per
municipality) to known demand—both overseas and
domestic—taking into account the location of com-
pany assets such as storage facilities and farms and
minimising transport distances. When matching
exports of soybean products (i.e. tons of soybean meal
or oil) to soy production (tons of soybeans), SEI-PCS
converts soy products into ‘soybean equivalents’ using
conversion factors which respect meal versus oil
crushing ratios and account for waste losses during
crushing (FAO 2018b). To test the sensitivity of our
results to the linear programming step, we also ran an
alternative analysis, where instead of transport dis-
tance minimisation, the soy deforestation occurring
within 200 km of each logistic hub was assigned pro-
portionally to all traders operating there (SIfigure S8).
Quantifying soy deforestation risk
For eachmunicipality and year, we intersectedmaps of
soy planted in the Cerrado and Amazon biomes with
deforestation maps to calculate the area of soy planted
on land deforested within the previous five years.
Soy crop maps were available from 2006–2007,
2009–2010, 2014–2015, and 2016–2017 in the Ama-
zon and 2006–2007, 2013–2014, and 2016–2017 in the
Cerrado (Agrosatélite 2018). In each year, we used the
subsequent available crop map and a five-year alloca-
tion period to link deforestation to soy (i.e. for the
2013 soy harvest in the Amazon, we intersected the
2014–2015 soy map with annual deforestation maps
from 2009–2013; SI figure S1). We used a five-year
allocation period to reflect that deforested land is
typically not immediately suitable for soy production
—the soil is prepared by planting with an intermediate
crop (e.g. rice or pasture) before soy is planted for
the first time (Osorio 2018). While previous studies
have also used one-year or three-year time lags
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Table 1. Summary of ZDCs in the soy sector.More details of these commitments are listed in SI Tables S2 and S3.
Commitment Geographical scope
Year intro-
duced
Cut-off for
deforestation Wording
Multi-stakeholder commitments
SoyMoratorium Brazilian Amazon biome 2006 July 2008 TheBrazilianAssociationof theVegetableOil Industry (ABIOVE),
theBrazilianAssociationofCereal Exporters (ANEC) and their
respectivemembers commit tonot purchase soywhich is planted
afterOctober2006 andwhich comes fromareas deforested in the
Amazonbiomeafter July 2006.
Note: the cut-off date was subsequentlymoved to July 2008.
NewYork
Declaration
on Forests
Global 2014 2020/2030 Withour varyingmandates, capabilities, and circumstances, collec-
tivelywe commit todoingourpart to achieve the followingout-
comes inpartnership:
• At least halve the rate of loss of natural forests globally by
2020 and strive to end natural forest loss by 2030.
• Support and help meet the private-sector goal of eliminating
deforestation from the production of agricultural commod-
ities such as palm oil, soy, paper and beef products by no later
than 2020.
Signed by 35 national governments, the EuropeanUnion, 19 sub-
national governments, more than 50 companies (including Car-
gill), 26 indigenous peoples, andmore thanmore than 50NGOs. A
full list of signatory countries is included in Table S1.
Amsterdam
Declaration
Global 2015 2020 We reiterate our objectives to support and helpmeet the private
sector goal of eliminating deforestation from the production of
agricultural commodities such as beef and leather, palmoil,
paper and pulp, soy and other commodities such as cocoa and
rubber by no later than 2020.
Signed by the governments of Norway, theUnited Kingdom, France,
Germany, Denmark, theNetherlands, and Italy.
Soft Commod-
ities Forum
Global, with an initial
focus on the Brazilian
Cerrado
2019 None SCFmember companies each have pledged to eliminate deforesta-
tion from their agricultural supply chainsworldwide, deploying
credible, tested science-basedmethodologies for defining forests
and biodiversityKThe SCF first aims to tackle land use chal-
lenges in the Brazil Cerrado
Note:monitoring is initially focused on 25 ‘prioritymunicipalities’ in
the Cerrado, selected based on havingmore than 5,000 hectares of
planted soy, high rates of soy-associated deforestation, and being
municipalities where SCF companies purchase soy.
Company commitments
Cargill Global 2014 2030 In 2014, Cargill endorsed TheNewYorkDeclaration on Forests,
announcing at theUnitedNationsClimate Summit our goal to
eliminate deforestation across our entire agricultural supply
chain, halving it by 2020 and ending it completely by 2030.
Note: Cargill updated this commitment in February and June 2019:
Cargill commits to a transparent and sustainable SouthAmerican
soy supply chain that:
• Transforms our supply chain to be deforestation free while
protecting native vegetation beyond forests.
Bunge commits to:
Bunge Global 2015 2020-2025 • achieve deforestation-free supply worldwide, considering
both direct and indirect sourcing
• employ science-based definitions and cutoff dates for defor-
estation determined by crediblemulti-stakeholder processes
ArcherDaniels
Midland
(ADM)
Global 2015 None We commit to build a transparent, traceable soy supply chain that
does not contribute to deforestation or exploitation.
Amaggi Global 2017 None With this commitment,we reaffirmourdesire to reach a supply chain
that is entirely deforestation free, thereforewedeclare thatwewill
work in conjunctionwith suppliers, customers, the civil society,
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(Gibbs et al 2015, Trase 2018b), a five-year time lag
captures the vast majority of crop-associated defores-
tation in Latin America (Graesser et al 2018).
We then attributed deforestation-associated soy to
the actors sourcing soy from each municipality. In the
absence of data on the individual contracts between
farmers and traders, we allocated soy deforestation to
each trader in proportion to the volume of soy that they
export from a given jurisdiction relative to its total pro-
duction of soy.We report thesefigures as the ‘soy defor-
estation risk’ (in hectares/thousand tons soy/year) of
each actor. When presenting these results per biome,
municipalities were classified according which biome
made up the majority of their area. Since deforestation
varies year-on-year due to many factors not related to
soy sourcing policies, we also calculated the soy defor-
estation risk ratio relative to themarket average for each
year—the ‘scaled deforestation risk’. Thismetric identi-
fies actors who consistently source from low- or high-
risk regions, even as deforestation rates fluctuate in the
short-term. Finally, we report the total deforestation
risk associated with each trader (in hectares/year),
though this metric reflects to a large extent their overall
market share (SI figure S7), and so we focus on the rela-
tive and scaled deforestationmetrics.
Our data on soy deforestation risks come with three
qualifications. First, we used the Brazilian government’s
official PRODES datasets when monitoring soy
deforestation risk in the Amazon and Cerrado
(INPE 2018a, 2018b). These data in the Cerrado include
both the loss of forest, andalso someareas ofnatural vege-
tation that arenot strictly forest, butwhichalso are impor-
tant for biodiversity conservation, carbon storage, and the
provisioning of other ecosystem services (Strassburg et al
2017), and are explicitly included in some ZDCs (SI table
S3). Second, these data do not monitor deforestation
beyond the Amazon and Cerrado. Though soy is planted
in all regions, only 1% of cropland expansion outside of
the Amazon and Cerrado in Brazil between 2000 and
2014 occurred over native vegetation (Zalles et al 2019).
Our results therefore capture the majority of native vege-
tation cleared for the expansion of soy in Brazil. Finally,
though we use the term ‘deforestation risk’ to reflect each
actor’s exposure to deforestation-associated soy, soy tra-
ders and other supply chain actors (producers, financiers,
investors, and retailers) are of course not passive risk-
receivers. Traders, for example, can actively create condi-
tions favouring the expansion of soy production through
local infrastructure and financial investments in new
frontiers, or reduce direct deforestation in the jurisdic-
tions fromwhich they sourceby implementingZDCs.
Reviewing ZDCs in the soy sector
We identified a list of the 30 traders that purchased
more than 1% of Brazil’s soy harvest in any given year
over the last decade (2008–2017). In total they handled
87% of soy exports over that period. We assessed their
soy sustainability policies, drawing on the Forest 500
assessments (Global Canopy 2018) and analysis of
company websites and corporate sustainability report-
ing materials. We defined ‘zero-deforestation commit-
ments’ as written commitments to avoid, for a specific
region or globally, commodities produced on recently
converted land, to remove from their soy supply chain
all deforestation (a zero gross target), or to balance
deforestation with reforestation (a zero net target). For
consumer countries, these commitments included the
NYDF and Amsterdam declarations. We then assessed
each of these commitments against eleven criteria of
their potential effectiveness (Garrett et al 2019) and
linked them to our data on deforestation risk. One
prominent commitment, the Soy Moratorium, has
been the subject of several previous assessments
(Rudorff et al 2011, Azevedo et al 2015, Gibbs et al 2015,
Kastens et al 2017, Silva and Lima 2018); we therefore
focus our analyses on the remaining commitments, for
which there are no quantitative estimates of their
impact.
Table 1. (Continued.)
Commitment Geographical scope
Year intro-
duced
Cut-off for
deforestation Wording
andgovernments in order to achieve this result in the shortest time
possible.
Note: Amaggi updated this commitment in June 2019, clarifying that:
[The commitment] applies to all locations wherewe operate, in
and outside Brazil, including theCerrado andAmazon biomes
LouisDreyfus Global 2018 None LDC commits to influence and collaborate with stakeholders
across the soy supply chain in order to: Eliminate engagement
in, or financing of deforestation throughout our supply chain,
and conserve biomes proven to be of high ecological value, such
as theCerrado, Brazil, with the intent to discourage and elim-
inate conversion of native vegetation.
Glencore
Agriculture
Global 2019 None We areworking collaboratively with producers and suppliers along
our supply chains to eradicate deforestation, increase sustain-
ability and protect high carbon stock forest, valuable conserva-
tion areas and peatlands fromuncontrolled expansion.
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Results and discussion
We identified ten ZDCs applying to the Brazilian soy
sector (table 1, SI table S3). Four of these are multi-
stakeholder commitments: the Amazon Soy Morator-
ium, NYDF, Amsterdam Declaration, and Soft Com-
modities Forum. The remaining six are unilateral
commitments by the five largest soy traders (Bunge,
Cargill, Amaggi, Louis Dreyfus, and Archer Daniels
Midland, henceforth ‘ADM’), and the13th largest trader,
Glencore, together responsible for 56.6%ofBrazilian soy
exports and 66.3% of export-associated soy deforesta-
tion risk over the last decade (SI figure S2). Amongst
these ZDCs there appears, however, to be a trade-off
between their ambition and accountability. The Soy
Moratorium applies only to the Amazon biome, but is
independently audited for direct soy deforestation using
satellite imagery (ABIOVE 2019). The other pledges are
global in scope but lack independent auditing and
transparentmonitoringmechanisms.
ZDCcoverage has increased but is uneven
Signatories of the Soy Moratorium handle approxi-
mately 90% of the soy exported from the Amazon
(figure 2). In contrast, only 46.5% of soy exported from
the Cerrado in 2017 was traded by companies who have
made commitments, though this figure was zero only
four years earlier (figure 2). The growth inZDCcoverage
stems from an increase in the number of commitments
over time rather than an increase in the market share of
committed traders (table 1, SI figure S10), and ZDC
coverage is expected to increase further. Themembers of
the Soft Commodities Forum (launched in 2019),
purchased 56.2% of soy exported from the Cerrado
between 2006 and 2017, though in practice the ZDC
coverage will be lower than this, because themonitoring
of this commitment is initially focused on 25 ‘priority
municipalities’ which supply 25.3% of member compa-
nies’ soy fromtheCerrado (GlencoreAgriculture 2019).
No evidence of reductions in soy deforestation risk
outside theAmazon
Together with public policies to reduce deforestation,
the SoyMoratorium helped curtail direct clearance for
soy in the Amazon (Nepstad et al 2014, Gibbs et al
2015). The soy deforestation risk of traders operating
in the region declined in particular from2008 onwards
(figure 3), the year that satellite monitoring of the Soy
Moratorium was introduced (Gibbs et al 2015) . The
individual corporate commitments, the NYDF, the
Amsterdam Declaration, and the Soft Commodities
Forum are all more recent (post-2014) and we have
limited years of post-commitment data with which to
judge their progress. Our data—the first quantitative
monitoring of their impacts—show no evidence of
additional reductions in the deforestation risk of
committed actors sincemaking these pledges.
The soy deforestation risk of Bunge fell over the
past decade (figure 2(a)), following the broadermarket
trend (figure 1), though their risk in the Cerrado,
where the Soy Moratorium does not apply, remained
consistently above or equal to the market average for
each year (figure 2(b)). There has been no marked
improvement in their soy deforestation risk since
making their commitment in 2015; Bunge’s deforesta-
tion risk in Matopiba rose in 2016, and fell in 2017,
with their deforestation risk in the Cerrado as a whole
remaining close to the market average in 2017. Simi-
larly, Cargill’s soy deforestation risk in the Cerrado
and Matopiba fluctuated around the market average
with no clear improvement since their 2014 commit-
ment to halve deforestation in their supply chains by
2020. ADM’s deforestation risk fluctuated around or
below the market average, with no change after mak-
ing their commitment. The commitments by Amaggi
(in 2017), Louis Dreyfus (in 2018), and Glencore (in
2019) are too recent to be assessed, though Amaggi’s
and Louis Dreyfus’ deforestation risk in the Cerrado
has been consistently below the market average since
the late 2000s, and they have only intermittently
sourced soy from within Matopiba. Glencore’s
Figure 2.The coverage of ZDCs is higher in theAmazon, where the SoyMoratorium applies, than in the Cerrado, where it does not.
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deforestation risk has also been low, though it has
increased since 2010, when their sourcing expanded
out from states in the south of Brazil, such as Paraná
into states such as Mato Grosso and Matopiba, where
soy deforestation rates are higher (figure S11).
Though these companies’ soy deforestation risk
declined in the Amazon after the implementation of
the Soy Moratorium, companies’ soy deforestation
risk in the Cerrado appears to be more strongly deter-
mined by the geographies in which they have histori-
cally made infrastructure investments than their
specific procurement policies. Bunge, for example, is
the largest exporter of soy to Europe (handling 20% of
EU imports from 2006 to 2017) and has invested heav-
ily in the Amazon andMatopiba, which are logistically
closer to European markets. Bunge operate two ports
in Pará in the Amazon, and two soy crushing facilities
and one refining facility in Matopiba, where most soy
deforestation is taking place (figure 1). Cargill and
ADM also operate in Matopiba and have higher soy
deforestation risk in the Cerrado than Amaggi and
Louis Dreyfus, who operate mainly in older soy fron-
tiers in Mato Grosso and the south-west Cerrado,
respectively, where soy already occupies much of the
landscape (SI figure S3). Amaggi’s soy deforestation
risk, for example, was high in the mid-2000s before
decreasing, reflecting the pattern of soy expansion in
Mato Grosso (figure 1). Since 2011, Glencore have
operated three storage facilities inMato Grosso, where
they have since sourced 15%–36%of their soy, though
they are otherwise and an asset-light trader, with the
origin of their sourcing shifting year-on-year (SI
figure S4).
A similar picture emerges for commitments by
countries. After the implementation of the Soy Mor-
atorium, deforestation risks in the Amazon declined to
low levels for all consumer markets. NYDF and
Amsterdam declaration countries have oscillated
around the market average in all regions, and this has
remained essentially unchanged since their commit-
ments, with their deforestation risk increasing in 2016,
but falling in 2017 (figure 4).
Using supply chain data tomonitor ZDCs
We apply a state-of-the-art data set on the Brazilian
soy supply chain to attribute deforestation to supply
chain actors and provide much needed transparency
on the coverage and impacts of ZDCs in the soy sector.
Aswith all analyses, some limitations apply.
First, we present a novel approach for monitoring
ZDCs, though the conclusions we can draw from the
presented data (covering 2006–2017) are limited by the
time series analysed. Additional data from pre-2006
would capture the pattern of deforestation risk prior to
the establishment of the Soy Moratorium; unfortu-
nately, deforestation data are only available from 2000
in theAmazon and 2001 in theCerrado,which prevents
earlier analysis (accounting for thefive-year lag between
deforestation and the establishment of soy). Similarly,
the impact of the commitments byAmaggi, LouisDrey-
fus, Glencore, and the Soft Commodities Forum on
deforestation risk cannot be analysed with our trade
data, as they were made after our time-series. We do,
however, present additional assessments of the for-
mulation of these commitments (table S3), and note
that our proposedmethod allows for futuremonitoring
Figure 3. (A)The soy deforestation risk (ha/thousand tons soy) of the top ten soy exporters, in the Amazon, Cerrado, andMatopiba.
(B) Soy deforestation risk, scaled to themarket average for each region and year (shown as a horizontal grey line). Points above (below)
one, shown as a grey line, have above (below) averagemarket risk in each region in each year. Dashed blue lines demark the year that
ZDCswere implemented, 2008 for the SoyMoratorium, and 2014–2018 for other commitments. Note: COFCO entered the Brazilian
soymarket through the acquisition of the tradersNidera andNoble Agri between 2014 and 2017; the trend-line for COFCOpre-2014
refers to the deforestation risk of these two companies. These trends are plotted for all assessed traders in SIfigures S3–5.
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of the changes in their deforestation risk as time
goes on.
Second, though we use rich data on soy infra-
structure and trade, we are unable to triangulate the ori-
gin of all soy flows. The proportion of unknown flows
varies between traders (SIfigure S8), but was 6.7%–9.9%
of the total exported volume in thepost-2014period.
Third, our soy deforestation risk does not include
indirect land use change where the expansion of soy
drives deforestation through the displacement of cattle
ranching or effects on expected agricultural rents
(Richards et al 2015; Arana et al 2019).
Fourth, several of these commitments includemul-
tiple commodities and regions (SI table S3). TheNYDF,
for example, applies to all sources of deforestation and
the Amsterdam Declarations apply to both soy and oil
palm production, and a complete picture of their
impactsmust analyse deforestation trends acrossmulti-
ple commodities and regions. The Trase initiative is
seeking to address these gaps and cover 70% of forest-
risk agricultural commodities by 2020 (Trase 2018b).
Fifth, since there are no public data on individual
contracts between farmers and traders, soy deforesta-
tion risk is measured at the municipal, rather than the
farm level. While it is in theory possible for actors to
have deforestation-free supply chains even while sour-
cing from jurisdictions where there is soy-associated
deforestation, we contend that municipal-level ‘soy
deforestation risk’ is a meaningful measure of each
actor’s deforestation footprint. In many regions, soy-
sourcing is locally consolidated: 30%–51% of soy (and
31%–63% of soy deforestation risk) each year was tra-
ded through logistic hubs where three or fewer com-
panies operated, and at the municipal-level, we
estimate that 48%–67% of soy (and 38%–74% of soy
deforestation risk) comes from municipalities where
three or fewer companies were actively sourcing soy.
This consolidation suggests that we can have some
confidence when allocatingmunicipal-level deforesta-
tion risk to each actor. Our results are also robust to a
sensitivity analysis allocating soy deforestation risk
frommunicipalities of production to logistic hubs not
using linear programming, but assuming a 200 km
sourcing distance around the logistic hubs fromwhich
they source (SI figure S8). Alternative methods of allo-
cating risk (for example based on changes in traders’
sourcing from jurisdictions, rather than their market
share), would be a valuable area of future work. Even
so, any local mis-matches in the allocation of defor-
estation risk are further mitigated when analysing
deforestation risk across the entirety of each actor’s
sourcing areas. Municipal-level assessments also bring
some advantages. ZDCs should arguably be judged on
their net impact on deforestation (Garrett et al 2019),
as they can be undermined by leakage. If a committed
actor’s non-compliant producers continue to clear
land and switch to sell to non-committed traders, the
ZDC’s net effect on deforestation will have been zero.
Farm-level analyses of individual supply chains will,
however, fail to assess these net effects, which may be
detected at larger scales.
Sixth, supply chain data alone cannot address
some of the definitional issues with ZDCs—notably
ambiguity around what constitutes deforestation. The
Cerrado, the hotspot of soy expansion in Brazil, is a
savannah biome, which consists of a mosaic of natural
vegetation types, from tall forest to shrub- and grass-
land. While Cargill’s, Amaggi’s and Louis Dreyfus’s
commitments explicitly mention the protection of the
Cerrado, others do not, and there is ambiguity over
what vegetation types are covered (SI table S3). When
monitoring soy deforestation risk in the Amazon and
Figure 4. (A)The soy deforestation risk (ha/Mton) of different consumermarkets. (B)The soy deforestation risk, relative to the
market average in each year (the grey line).
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Cerrado, we used Brazilian government data on the
loss of native vegetation. Our results are therefore
aligned with official efforts to monitor and enforce the
Brazilian Forest Code, the Amazon Soy Moratorium,
and the Soft Commodities Forum’s ZDC, and reflect
the ongoing impact that committed actors have on
Brazil’s natural resources. Narrower definitions of
what natural vegetation types are protected under
ZDCs risk leakage, where biodiversity and carbon ben-
efits are undermined by the displacement of soy
expansion into other natural vegetation types (Popp
et al 2014, Garrett et al 2019).
Finally, it is worth highlighting that improvement
in transparency, whether through independent initia-
tives such as Trase, or through trader initiatives such as
the Soft Commodities Forum, of course does not, in
and of itself, reduce deforestation. While transparency
is a critical precondition for accountability (Gardner
et al 2018), concrete changes in company sourcing and
producer land use decision-making are required to
break the link between the expansion of soy and
deforestation.
Prospects for deforestation-free soy
Brazil has large areas of forests and savannah that may
legally—and illegally—be cleared for commodity
production. We show, however, that a growing
proportion of Brazil’s soy exports are traded by
companies who have made ZDCs. Apart from the Soy
Moratorium, however, we find no noticeable reduc-
tion of soy deforestation risk of committed actors.
Which begs the question—what are the prospects for
zero deforestation soy?
On paper, deforestation-free soy production is
achievable. In the Amazon, where the Soy Morator-
ium applies, direct clearance for soy occurs at low
levels (∼1% per year) (Gibbs et al 2015, ABIOVE
2019), and in the Cerrado, 70% of recent soy expan-
sion (2000–2014) occurred over land that in 2000 was
pasture, rather than native vegetation (Carneiro
et al 2016). The Brazilian context is in many ways
favourable to the implementation of ZDCs. Both the
Amazon and Cerrado have abundant pasture land
available for further soy expansion (Carneiro
et al2016, Strassburg et al 2017, Rausch et al 2019), and
Brazil also has unique public monitoring capacities,
including high-quality remote sensing products and a
rural property cadaster (SI table S3). As these ZDCs are
currently defined and implemented, however, pro-
spects for their future effectiveness in reducing defor-
estation remain very uncertain (SI table S3).
Other than the Soy Moratorium, these commit-
ments either set future cut-off dates for deforestation
or no cut-off dates at all. Without concrete cut-off
dates for deforestation in the immediate future or the
past, these commitments are very unlikely to dis-
courage further clearance, as producers continue to
receive the message that deforestation-associated soy
can bemarketedwithout repercussion.
Outside the Amazon, none of these commitments
set out transparent mechanisms for their monitoring
or enforcement, and implementation appears to lag
behind promises. Signatories of the Soy Moratorium
have implemented an independently-audited, stan-
dardised monitoring system (SI table S3), while mon-
itoring efforts in the Cerrado are not standardised and
less transparent. Bunge reports having 90% trace-
ability to the farm level for their direct suppliers in
Matopiba and Mato Grosso and state that in 2017/18,
98 of their monitored farms were flagged for defor-
estation, of which nine were subsequently suspended
(SI table S3). Cargill has a pledge to eliminate defor-
estation from their supply chain by 2030, but their
efforts to date have focused on illegal deforestation (SI
table S3). Even so, as recently as October 2017 both
Bunge and Cargill, along with ABC Industria (part of
Algar Agro group), and a handful of other soy traders
were fined BRL 24.6million (USD 6.7million) for ille-
gal clearance in the Cerrado (Spring 2018). ADM
releases a quarterly progress report on their soy sus-
tainability initiatives, which states that they have col-
lected farm boundary data for 100% of their supplier
farms in 13 priority municipalities in Matopiba.
Beyond improving traceability, their implementation
appears to be at the engagement stage, however. ADM
lists efforts to ‘engage with suppliers’ and ‘explain the
No Deforestation Policy’, but does not report levels of
non-compliance, nor the procedures they followwhen
infringements are identified (SI table S3). Amaggi
reports that 19% of its soy is traded under zero defor-
estation certification, with a further 12% covered by
the Soy Moratorium (SI table S3). In 2018, 1315 grain
supplier registrations were flagged for socio-environ-
mental non-compliance, though Amaggi does not
report what actions were taken after identifying these
possible breaches. Louis Dreyfus does not provide
details of their traceability or mechanisms of enforce-
ment (SI table S3). Glencore beganmonitoring its sup-
pliers in September 2018, but does not provide any
information on the origin of their sourcing. Glencore
reports that it has since detected non-compliance in its
supply chains but does not detail how many infringe-
ments occured, what these infringements were, or
what actions were taken (SI table S3).
Regarding commitments by governments, evi-
dence of implementation is also lacking (SI table S4).
Government participation in the NYDF was arguably
more a goal-setting exercise than a concrete move to
reduce the deforestation risks of their consumers
(Lambin et al 2018), and civil society efforts to follow
up on it have focused on private sector signatories
(Climate Focus 2016). The Amsterdam Declarations
were meant to have a stronger focus on translating
commitments into action, but still appear to be in the
engagement rather than implementation stages.
France, with arguably the most advanced efforts,
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announced in December 2018 a 17-point plan for
reducing the deforestation embedded in their imports.
The plan includes a commitment to use development
aid to incentivise producing regions to adopt zero
deforestation practices, and promises a review of legis-
lation about businesses’ due diligence on deforestation
risks (France 2019) (SI).
Importantly, several other systemic issues must be
addressed to increase the potential effectiveness of
ZDCs. First, ZDCs must not be selectively applied.
While Amaggi and Louis Dreyfus havemade ZDCs and
have soy infrastructure in lower risk areas, in 2009 they
set up a joint-venture, ALZGrãos to establish a foothold
in the soy frontier in Matopiba (Graner 2018). ALZ
Grãos has invested in soy storage, wholesale facilities,
and a port terminal in the region and export 0.4–1.2
Mtons each year. Including the deforestation risk of this
joint-venture in the sourcing of Amaggi or Louis Drey-
fus increases their deforestation risk in 2017 by 5-fold
and 10-fold, respectively (figure 5).
Second, though committed traders made up
47.9% of the soy export market in 2017, the propor-
tion of soy deforestation associated with other compa-
nies and markets is growing (figure 6). The relative
importance of AmsterdamDeclaration andNYDF sig-
natory countries is also decreasing as their market
share has been overtaken by the growth of exports to
China, which purchased 64% of Brazil’s soy exports in
2017 (SI figure S11). ZDCs will be most effective at
reducing commodity-associated deforestation if they
avoid creating a segmented marketplace, where defor-
estation-free soy is sold to a minority of committed
markets and other soy flows elsewhere. Part of the suc-
cess of the SoyMoratorium in reducing soy-associated
deforestation likely comes down to its comprehensive-
ness, in including all ABIOVE and ANEC members
(table 1), responsible for ca. 90% of soy exports from
the Amazon, thereby sending a consistent message to
producers and limiting inter-actor leakage. Multi-sta-
keholder initiatives, such as the Soft Commodities
Forum (table 1) and the Cerrado Working Group
could play a key role in trying to move the sector as a
whole onto a more sustainable footing. The recent
(December 2019) development of a compensation
mechanism in the Cerrado also offers promise
(Byrne 2019), especially if the original participants
(Tesco, Nutreco, and Grieg Seafood) are joined by
other signatories of the Cerrado Manifesto. Ulti-
mately, the demands of the Chinese market are
increasingly setting the agenda for soy sustainability.
While Chinese firms are more focused on legality than
zero deforestation, the Chinese meat industry, a major
downstream consumer of Brazilian soybeans, has
adopted a ZDC (WWF 2017), and the chairman of
Figure 5.The soy deforestation risk (ha) of Amaggi (A), Louis Dreyfus (B), and their joint-venture ALZGrãos.
Figure 6.Traders and consumermarkets not covered by ZDCs account for an increasing proportion of soy deforestation risk.
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COFCO, the largest Chinese soy trader operating in
Brazil, has called for extending the SoyMoratorium to
theCerrado (Lyu 2019).
Finally, soy ZDCs will only be effective if committed
actors seek solutions across the agricultural sector. Even
where soy expands over pasture and is ‘deforestation-
free’, it displaces beef production and creates incentives
for further deforestation by driving up expected agri-
cultural rents and injecting capital into agricultural mar-
kets (Richards 2015, Richards and Arima 2018,Miranda
et al 2019). Rapidly expanding crops, such as soy, can
therefore only be deforestation-free if deforestation is
constrained in the agricultural sector into whose land it
expands. Ultimately, cross-sectoral collaboration is
required to pair efforts to guide soy expansion onto low
productivity agricultural land (e.g. cattle pasture) with
efforts to close the forest frontier and constrain the
expansion of cattle ranching in frontier regions, and
spare land through the intensification of cattle ranching
and adoption of integrated crop-livestock systems
(Garrett et al2018,Koch et al2019,Nepstad et al2019).
Conclusion
Between2006and2017, 0.6–1.9Mhaof soywereplanted
each year on recently deforested land in Brazil, driven by
growing global demand and fluctuations in capital
availability, political opportunity, and exogenous factors
such as currency exchange rates (Richards et al 2012,
Pailler 2018, Richards and Arima 2018). Deforestation-
free commodity production is however possible, and a
growing proportion of the market have made commit-
ments to zero deforestation commodity production.
Without transparency on their implementation and
impacts, however, committed actors cannot be held
accountable, and ZDCs risk becoming a missed oppor-
tunity for supply chain governance. Here we present a
pragmatic approach for monitoring the deforestation
risks of actors with and without ZDCs, finding mixed
impacts of ZDCs so far in the Brazilian soy sector.
Though the Soy Moratorium has helped reduce direct
clearance for soy in the Amazon, we find no evidence for
ZDCs reducing deforestation risk in the Cerrado. Look-
ing forward, our approach can be used to provide
independent monitoring of progress in delivering on
promises for zerodeforestation commodities.
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